Sebastian Mendel a écrit :
Marc Delisle schrieb:
Sebastian Mendel a écrit :
Marc Delisle schrieb:
Sebastian,
this part of the patch: /**
- protect against deep recursion attack CVE-2006-1549,
- 1000 seems to be more than enough
- */
+if (count($GLOBALS) > 1000) {
- die('possible deep recurse attack');
+}
is not reached when I test the attack of MOPB-02, it's the other part that protects for this attack.
Do you know in which case this code would trigger? In the case of an attempt to override $GLOBALS?
it should trigger if and only if register_globals is on
I cannot make this code trigger when register_globals is on, it's always the protection in PMA_arrayWalkRecursive() that triggers.
I'm attacking with curl http://127.0.0.1/phpmyadmin/ -d a`php -r 'echo str_repeat("[a]",20000);'`=1
do you have some other attack in mind?
this will trigger with
phpmyadmin/?1=1;2=2;3=3;...;100000=100000
this would also be triggered inside PMA_arrayWalkRecursive() but at this point we could have allready iterated over $GLOBALS ...
Thanks for the clarification. I tried to trigger this (with register_globals On)
curl http://localhost/phpmyadmin/?%60php -r 'for ($i=1; $i < 10000; $i++) {echo "$i=$i;";}'`
I got: <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <TITLE>414 Request-URI Too Large</TITLE> </HEAD><BODY> <H1>Request-URI Too Large</H1> The requested URL's length exceeds the capacity limit for this server.<P> request failed: URI too long<P>
=========
With less values: curl http://localhost/phpmyadmin/?%60php -r 'for ($i=1; $i < 10000; $i++) {echo "$i=$i;";}'`
numeric key detected --------
Ok let's try something else:
curl http://localhost/phpmyadmin/?%60php -r 'for ($i=1; $i < 1000; $i++) {echo "x" . $i . "=$i;";}'`
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <TITLE>414 Request-URI Too Large</TITLE> </HEAD><BODY> <H1>Request-URI Too Large</H1> The requested URL's length exceeds the capacity limit for this server.<P> request failed: URI too long<P>